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RESPONSE 
 
FEES, INCENTIVES, AND DETERRENCE 
LINDA SANDSTROM SIMARD†
In response to Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too 
Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2010) and David Marcus, Response, 
Attorneys’ Fees and the Social Legitimacy of Class Actions, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 155 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/02-
2011/Marcus.pdf.  
 
 
Undaunted by the common refrain accusing class action lawyers 
of collecting astronomical fees while class members walk away with 
almost nothing, Professor Brian Fitzpatrick serves as provocateur in 
asserting that lawyers should receive higher fees and that class 
members should receive less compensation in small-stakes class 
actions.1  Although the proposal is seemingly outrageous in light of 
public opinion, it is theoretically appealing for several reasons.  First, 
to the extent that the proposal prioritizes deterrence, it is consistent 
with the enhancement of individual welfare.2
 
†
Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.  I thank Matthew Howard for 
valuable research assistance. 
  A system that deploys 
1
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
2043, 2047 (2010) (proposing that “the optimal award of fees to class action lawyers in 
small-stakes actions is 100% of judgments”).  The phrase “small-stakes class action” 
typically refers to a class action that joins together claims that cannot be economically 
litigated on an individual basis.  See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction 
and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2088 
(2008) (using the phrase “small-stakes class action” for this type of action).  Damages 
for the individual claims can range from almost nothing to several thousand dollars. 
2
Class action litigation serves dual functions:  minimization of accident costs 
through prevention of unreasonable risk (deterrence) and compensation for injuries 
caused by reasonable risk (insurance).  See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and 
Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 
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scarce resources to prevent, rather than insure, wrongful conduct is 
better for everyone.3  Second, Fitzpatrick’s proposal significantly 
reduces agency costs associated with the relationship between the 
attorney and the class, thus increasing the efficiency of adjudicatory 
regulation.4  Indeed, if the entire judgment is awarded as fees, agency 
costs are all but eliminated.  Third, Fitzpatrick’s proposal streamlines 
the process for class certification because typicality and adequacy of 
representation become irrelevant when class members have no skin in 
the game.5
Professor David Marcus identifies a number of problems that 
hinder any serious consideration of the proposal.
  Finally, the proposal is appealing because it offers a 
normative justification for the award of fees, something that is often 
absent under the existing fee-setting regime.  Notwithstanding these 
benefits, the proposal raises some serious questions. 
6  Specifically, 
Marcus questions whether the proposal would pass muster under 
existing doctrinal constraints imposed by the Rules Enabling Act and 
the law of unjust enrichment.7  He also takes issue with Fitzpatrick’s 
premise that full enforcement of substantive law necessarily increases 
social welfare, instead suggesting that procedural law may be an 
effective vehicle for fine tuning the regulatory force of substantive 
law.8  Overall, Marcus believes that the social legitimacy of the class 
action device will decline sharply if Fitzpatrick’s proposal is adopted.9
 
1873-74 (2002) (discussing the two goals of “tort deterrence and insurance” in the 
context of class actions).  Fitzpatrick asserts that the insurance function is not relevant 
in small-stakes class actions and that therefore we should seek to maximize deterrence.  
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2047. 
 
3
See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1891 (arguing that the costs of preventing 
unreasonable risk are lower than the costs of compensating for the loss that otherwise 
would arise from such risk). 
4
Agency costs arise in the context of class action litigation when class members 
lack the ability and incentive to monitor the lawyer’s actions, thus creating a risk that 
class action attorneys will serve their own interests at the expense of the class.  See 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Actions and 
Derivative Litigation:  Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1, 5 (1991) (“The named plaintiff does little—indeed, usually does nothing—to 
monitor the attorney in order to ensure that representation is competent and zealous, 
or to align the interests of the attorney with those of the class or corporation.”).   
5
See id. at 5-6 (arguing that when class action attorneys purchase class members’ 
claims, typicality and adequacy of representation become irrelevant).   
6
David Marcus, Response, Attorneys’ Fees and the Social Legitimacy of Class Actions, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 157 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/ 
02-2011/Marcus.pdf. 
7
Id. at 158-60. 
8
Id. at 161-63. 
9
Id. at 163-66. 
14 - SIMARD FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011 10:07 AM 
12 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra [Vol. 160:10 
While Professor Marcus persuasively presents each of his 
arguments, two fundamental questions remain unanswered: (1) how 
much more deterrence can we expect to derive from an increase in 
fees to class action lawyers?;10
Fitzpatrick’s proposal rests upon an assertion that deterrence is 
the sole purpose of small-stakes class actions, at least from a social-
welfare utilitarian perspective.
 and (2) what are the costs associated 
with a significant increase in small-stakes class actions?  The following 
analysis suggests that the increase in deterrence may be far 
outweighed by the increase in costs associated with the proposal. 
11  To maximize deterrence, Fitzpatrick 
asserts that we should incentivize lawyers to file more small-stakes class 
actions by allocating a greater proportion of class awards to fees.12
To test the logic of this proposal, we must begin with the basic 
theory of deterrence:  when an actor is threatened with liability for its 
harmful conduct in an amount that correlates to the extent of injury 
caused by the conduct, the actor will have an incentive to take 
precautions to avoid the injury.
  
The increase in filings will, in turn, result in more class awards and 
more deterrence. 
13
 
10
See id. at 161 (touching the issue only lightly by raising the possibility that a risk-
averse plaintiffs’ lawyer might accept a settlement offer that is well below the amount 
of injury caused to the class, thus reducing the overall payout by the defendant and the 
deterrent effect of the litigation).  
  Thus, if an actor must choose 
11
Fitzpatrick states:  
Small-stakes class actions serve no insurance function because individuals are 
not risk averse with respect to small losses. . . . In fact, when the administrative 
costs and profit margins of providing insurance are added to the equation, it 
is actually irrational for individuals to buy insurance against losses for which 
they are not risk averse. 
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2067-68.  
12
Professor Fitzpatrick suggests that “every additional dollar given to plaintiffs 
instead of their attorneys will decrease the level of deterrence even further from the 
optimum.”  Id. at 2062. 
13
Under this theory, the actor  
aggregates all possible accident scenarios and all possible marginal 
investments in precautions.  If appropriately motivated, the [actor] will take 
precautions to the point that maximizes aggregate welfare, that is, the point at 
which the aggregate cost of making an additional aggregate unit of 
investment in precautions would exceed the aggregate benefit from avoiding 
the corresponding aggregate unit of accident risk.  The [actor] cannot know 
or predict how or to what degree contemplated conduct will benefit or harm 
any particular individual in the potentially affected population.  The 
possibilities are infinite and are “knowable” only as statistically weighted 
probabilities. 
Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1914. 
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between two actions, one that is socially optimal (such as investing in 
precautions to reduce the risk of injury) and another that is socially 
suboptimal (failing to take precautions), then the actor will have an 
incentive to take the optimal action if the expected liability from 
taking the suboptimal action exceeds the cost of the optimal action.14  
The deterrent value of threatened litigation, therefore, is equal to the 
expected loss from the litigation.  Whether litigation is actually filed 
or not, the actor will be motivated to invest in precautions if she 
believes that a credible threat of litigation exists.15
The motivation to invest in precautions hinges upon the 
credibility of the threat of litigation.  If an actor believes that litigation 
is not likely to be filed or that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on 
the merits, then the actor is less likely to invest in precautions than if 
he believes otherwise.  To the extent that small-stakes litigation is not 
economically viable on an individual basis, these claims create no 
credible threat of litigation and no incentive to invest in precautions.  
When a lawyer takes on a group of small-stakes claims and a court 
certifies a class action, however, these claims create a credible threat 
of litigation and a corresponding incentive to invest in precautions.  
Thus, an actor choosing between socially optimal or socially 
suboptimal conduct will anticipate a lawyer’s incentive to file a class 
action suit by calculating whether the expected return to the attorney 
will equal or exceed the expected costs of bringing suit.
 
16
 
14
For example, an actor may expect an aggregate injury of $5,000,000 if it fails to 
invest in precautions, or zero if it invests in precautions.  Assuming a class action will 
have an 80% chance of success for the plaintiff class, the actor will expect a loss of 
$4,000,000 if it fails to invest in precautions and zero if it invests in precautions.  Thus, 
if the cost of the precaution is less than $4,000,000, then a rational actor would choose 
to invest in precautions to avoid the threat of litigation.  As the probability of success 
by the class decreases, both the actor’s expected loss and the deterrent value of the 
threatened litigation will decrease.     
 
15
The deterrent value of threatened litigation is dependent upon the ex ante 
calculation of expected loss, not the actual loss incurred when litigation is filed.  Of 
course, if the actor finds that its estimates are materially wrong, subjecting it to a loss 
that is greater or less than expected, then the actor may be motivated to refine its 
methods of calculation for future decisions regarding potential injury.  
16
Assuming the attorney’s fee is calculated as a percent of the fund, the incentive 
to file can be represented by the following formula: 
c < f * p  * l 
where: 
c = total costs (including opportunity costs to the attorney as measured by the 
value the attorney places on his or her time) 
f = fee percentage awarded to attorney’s fees 
p  = probability of success by the class 
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Under the existing fee regime, a credible threat of litigation exists 
for all class actions that offer an expected fee equal to or exceeding 
expected costs.  As a general rule, economic viability is dependent 
upon the probability of success on the merits and the amount in 
controversy.  Consider a lawsuit where the fee award is 25% of a 
judgment or settlement17 and costs are in the range of $500,000.  A 
class action seeking less than $2,000,000 is unlikely to be economically 
viable; a class action seeking $2,500,000 will be viable if the probability 
of success is 80% or higher; and a class action seeking $4,500,000 will 
be viable if the probability of success is 45% or higher.  Class actions 
that offer a positive return under the existing fee regime pose a 
credible threat of litigation and a corresponding incentive for actors to 
invest in precautions to avoid suit.  Increasing the fee awarded to 
attorneys in these actions, and decreasing compensation to class 
members, will not increase the investment in precautions—it will 
merely increase the amount of excess profit to attorneys.18
To the extent that the Fitzpatrick proposal seeks to increase 
prevention by increasing the number of small-stakes class actions filed, 
we must consider the deterrence value derived from “new” class 
actions—those that are not economically viable to a lawyer under the 
existing fee regime but will become economically viable with the 
added benefit of a larger fee.
 
19
 
l = aggregate recovery. 
  If we assume a fee award of 100% of a 
In an efficient market, the attorney’s expected return should equal the expected costs; 
when the expected return exceeds the attorney’s expected costs, the attorney receives 
excess profits.  See Macey & Miller, supra note 4, at 24 (explaining that in an efficient 
market, a downward adjustment of the fee percentage would occur if lawyers received 
excess profits). 
17
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2045-46 (noting that under the existing regime, 
fees have coalesced around 25%). 
18
See Macey & Miller, supra note 4, at 59 (“[T]he percentage method [for 
calculating attorneys’ fees] results in systematic excess profits for plaintiffs’ attorneys—
returns beyond what the attorney would earn in an efficiently functioning market.”). 
19
This group of “new” class actions can be defined as class actions that offer:   
(1) an expected return under the existing fee regime that is less than the attorney’s 
expected costs; and (2) an expected return under the proposed regime that exceeds 
the attorney’s expected costs.  This can be represented by the formula: 
fe * p  * l  < c < fp * p  * l 
where: 
fe  = fee percentage awarded to attorney’s fees under the existing fee regime 
p   = probability of success by class 
l  = aggregate recovery 
c  = total costs  
fp  = fee percentage awarded to attorney’s fees under the Fitzpatrick proposal. 
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judgment or settlement and costs in the range of $500,000, the range 
of class actions that would be viable under the Fitzpatrick regime but 
not the existing system would include a class action seeking 
$2,000,000 when the probability of success is between 25% and 99%;20 
a class action seeking $2,500,000 when the probability of success is 
between 20% and 79%;21 and a class action seeking $4,500,000 when 
the probability of success is between 12% and 44%.22
As the probability of success by the plaintiff class decreases, both 
the expected loss from the threatened litigation and the ex ante 
deterrent value decrease.
  Overall, the 
Fitzpatrick proposal will create an incentive for lawyers to file new 
class actions, many of which will offer a lower probability of success 
than the class actions that are economically viable under the existing 
fee regime. 
23  To the extent that the Fitzpatrick proposal 
encourages lawyers to file new class actions that offer a relatively high 
probability of success to the class, we are likely to derive a 
correspondingly healthy increase in deterrence value from the threat 
of these suits.24  To the extent that the proposal encourages lawyers to 
file weak, small-stakes class actions, however, we are likely to derive a 
correspondingly weak deterrent value from the threat of these suits.25
Assuming that some increase in deterrence will arise from the 
proposed increase in fees, we must weigh the value of this increase 
against the costs associated with the proposal.  On a systemic level, the 
  
While it is impossible to determine the precise increase in deterrence 
that will be derived from the threat of new class actions, it is clear that 
we will derive diminishing returns on deterrence as weaker class 
actions are filed. 
 
20
In this example, claims seeking $2,000,000 are only economically viable under 
the existing regime if the likelihood of success is 100%. 
21
In this example, claims seeking $2,500,000 are viable under the existing fee 
regime if the probability of success is 80% or higher.  Under these conditions, they 
already pose a credible threat of litigation without the added adjustment of an 
increase in fees. 
22
In this example, claims seeking $4,500,000 are viable under the existing fee 
regime if the probability of success is 45% or higher.  Under these conditions, they 
already pose a credible threat of litigation.  
23
See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
24
For example, the Fitzpatrick proposal may encourage new class actions seeking 
between $1,000,000 and $2,000,000 that offer a 50% or greater probability of success, 
assuming costs of approximately $500,000. 
25
Likewise, the Fitzpatrick proposal may encourage new class actions seeking 
$5,000,000 and offering a probability of success to the class of 10 to 20%, assuming 
costs of approximately $500,000.    
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increased return to plaintiffs’ lawyers in small-stakes class actions will 
result in a redistribution of legal services.  Lawyers seeking to maximize 
the return on the investment of their time will divert legal services away 
from other types of cases in order to pursue small-stakes class actions.  
Indeed, in light of the dramatic disparity that will exist between small-
stakes class actions and other types of legal services, the “litigation 
explosion” cliché may become a reality.26
Moreover, class action lawyers motivated by the possibility of 
collecting 100% of a large award are likely to pursue victory with 
intensity.  In an effort to increase the probability of a successful 
outcome, lawyers are likely to invest extra time, depose more 
witnesses, hire more experts or investigators, serve more discovery, or 
engage in some combination of these actions.
  There is no evidence that our 
judicial system is prepared to absorb these extra demands. 
27  This increased 
intensity is likely to be most pronounced in the weakest cases.  
Defendants, faced with a formidable opponent, may dig their heels in 
and further intensify the battle, creating a cross current of effects.28  
Alternatively, defendants may choose to avoid the battle entirely by 
buying out the plaintiff-class lawyer.  Even very weak claims may offer a 
sizable return to the plaintiff-class lawyer if the downside risk to the 
defendant could be catastrophic.29
The Fitzpatrick proposal is theoretically enticing because it is easy 
to apply, it reduces concerns about adequacy of representation, and it 
provides a normative rationale for the award of class action fees.  
Notwithstanding these benefits, the proposal has serious drawbacks.  
Although the threat of a large increase in the number of small-stakes 
class actions is likely to increase the investment in precautions, the 
  Overall, the increase in systemic 
costs associated with the proposal—the aggregate of costs incurred by 
plaintiffs, defendants, and the court system—are likely to exceed the 
increase in deterrence derived from new class actions. 
 
26
See generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:  Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (discussing the alleged “litigation 
explosion” and possible reforms). 
27
See Albert Choi & Chris William Sanchirico, Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants 
Lose?  Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 
323, 325-26 (2004) (noting that higher stakes are associated with higher intensity of 
litigation effort). 
28
Id. at 327. 
29
See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(expressing concern that defendants may “be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy 
to settle even if they have no legal liability”).  
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magnitude of this increase will depend upon the estimated strength of 
the cases that are likely to be filed.  If the proposal allows weak class 
actions to become economically viable, then the increase in 
deterrence may be much smaller than we hope.  Indeed, the increase 
in deterrence may be dwarfed by the systemic costs associated with the 
proposal.  Moreover, this proposal incentivizes lawyers to invest in 
small-stakes class actions over alternative demands for legal services.  
Even if this proposal will increase deterrence to some degree, we must 
consider whether the redress of small-stakes injuries deserves such a 
tremendous investment of society’s legal resources. 
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